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THE FORTUNES AND FOIBLES OF
EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS: A POSITIVE MARKET RESPONSE
TO THE PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL FUNDS
BY WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE*
ABSTRACT
One of the most dynamic and complex new investment vehicles on the
market today is the exchange-traded fund (ETF), a security that provides
the diversification of a mutual fund but trades on a securities exchange like
a stock. In just fifteen years, the number of ETFs has proliferated to well
over 600, attracting more than half a trillion dollars in investment. The
majority of that expansion has occurred in just the past two years, largely
as a consequence of recent difficulties in the mutual fund industry. With
ETF sponsors aggressively seeking to create novel kinds of ETFs and to
add ETFs to retirement account menus, these funds are projected to
continue growing at a pace far faster than hedge funds and mutual funds in
the coming years.
Yet, for all this extraordinary growth, legal scholars have virtually
ignored ETFs. This article seeks to establish a descriptive and conceptual
framework for the scholarly discussion of these funds as they gain evergreater prominence, for good or for ill, in the coming years. In exploring
the structure, advantages, and shortcomings of ETFs, this article argues
that ETFs are a positive market response to the shortcomings of mutual
funds.
ETFs use a novel pricing mechanism that harnesses the utility of
arbitrage to provide investors with accuracy, efficiency, tax advantages,
and a range of investment choices, while insulating investors from many of
the structural problems associated with mutual funds. Despite these advantages, critics decry their brokerage fees and vulnerability to harmful shortterm trading. This article argues that the mutual fund industry and its
recent spate of dramatic scandals contributed to the emergence of ETFs
and concludes that mutual funds offer vivid warnings of the conflicts of
interest that may come to afflict the ETF industry as it continues to grow.
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"The market for exchange-traded funds will grow at a 29 per
cent clip over the next five years—outpacing all other
investment products including hedge funds and mutual funds
. . . ."
1

David Haywood, Financial Research Corporation

"There are 9,000 hedge funds, 8,000 mutual funds, and 500
ETFs. How can there be too many ETFs? We are just at the
start . . . ."
Jonathan Steinberg, founder and CEO, WisdomTree
2
Investments

"Many things going on in exchange traded funds are bordering
on insanity."
John C. Bogle, founder, Vanguard Group, Inc.

3

I. INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, not a single exchange-traded fund (ETF) existed in
the United States. Today, well over six hundred do. And from containing
nary a penny in investments at the time of their birth in the early 1990s,
they now hold assets of more than half a trillion dollars.4 More remarkably,

1

Rebecca Knight, ETFs Forecast to Outpace the Rest of Market, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
Jan. 2, 2007, at 19 (citing David Haywood, ETF Trends & Outlook: Strategic Developments for
Index, Semi-Active, and Active ETF Solutions, Aug. 15, 2006, available at http://www.frcnet.com/
FreeResearch/FRC/pdf/ FRC_Study_ETF_Executive%20Summary.pdf).
2
Deborah Brewster, The Wisdom of Innovation, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 23, 2007, at 9
(quoting Jonathan Steinberg).
3
John Waggoner, Great Minds Don't Think Alike About Index Funds, USA TODAY,
Apr. 16, 2007, at 4B (quoting John C. Bogle during an interview).
4
See Inv. Co. Inst., Exchange-Traded Fund Assets, December 2007, Jan. 30, 2008, available at http://www.ici.org/stats/latest/etfs_12_07.html#TopOfPage [hereinafter ICI December
2007 Report]. The combined assets of ETFs crossed the $500 billion threshold for the first time in
August 2007. Compare Inv. Co. Inst., Exchange-Traded Fund Assets, July 2007, Aug. 30, 2007,
available at http://www.ici.org/stats/etf/etfs_07_07.html#TopOfPage, with Inv. Co. Inst.,
Exchange-Traded Fund Assets, August 2007, Sept. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.ici.org/stats/etf/etfs_ 08_07.html#TopOfPage (showing total assets of ETFs of
$507.112 billion in August 2007 and $488.827 billion in July 2007).
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the vast majority of this explosive growth has occurred in just the past two
years, during which time the number of ETFs has more than tripled, from
201 to 629 funds, while their assets have more than doubled, from $296
billion to $608 billion.5 The rapid rise of ETFs coincides with—and owes
much to—the recent difficulties of their related investment instruments and
chief competition, mutual funds. Indeed, ETFs are natural successors to
mutual funds, and their success is a positive market response to the
shortcomings of mutual funds.
The first ETF, created in 1993, was designed to operate very much
like a mutual fund, with one critical difference.6 Whereas both mutual
funds and ETFs provide investors with access to an array of underlying
securities through a single investment, mutual funds may be bought and
sold at a price calculated just once a day, after the close of business. ETFs,
on the other hand, and as their name suggests, can be traded on securities
exchanges constantly while their prices are updated every few seconds
throughout the business day.7 In this respect, the ETF is a sophisticated
evolution of the mutual fund.
In order to make possible this novel pricing mechanism, ETF
sponsors index their funds to benchmarks—such as the Standard & Poor's
500 Composite Stock Price Index (S&P 500)8—so that investors in an ETF
can confirm that the price of the fund's shares at any given moment fairly
equals the price of all the underlying securities in the fund's portfolio.
Because a fund that merely tracks an existing index can be managed largely
with algorithms and trading programs, as opposed to human discretion, the
cost to run—and, accordingly, the price of investing in—these funds is

5
See ICI December 2007 Report, supra note 4; INV. CO. INST., 2007 MUTUAL FUND FACT
BOOK 1, 8 (47th ed. 2007), available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2007_factbook.pdf [hereinafter ICI FACT BOOK].
6
Actively Managed Exchange-Traded Funds, Exchange Act Release No. IC-25258, 17
C.F.R. § 270 (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/ic-25258.htm (discussing the operations of ETFs) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release].
7
See, e.g., Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts (SPDRs) SPDR Trust, Series 1, Prospectus,
at
2-5
(Jan. 26,
2007),
available
at
https://www.ssgafunds.com/fund_doc/fund_doc_20060523_
174046/SPDR_PROSPECTUS_2007.pdf [hereinafter SPDR Prospectus] (explaining the precise
dynamics of the SPDR Trust, including a description of how SPDR shares are designed to track
the value of stocks in the S&P 500 Index and are "listed for trading on the American Stock
Exchange," and explaining that "[t]he Trust issues and redeems SPDRs only in specified large lots
of 50,000 SPDRs or multiples thereof referred to as 'Creation Units'"); see also John Kimelman,
Fresh Pricing Is a Draw for Exchange-Traded Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 6.
"Exchange-traded funds can be traded throughout the day at constantly updated prices, a feature
that may have particular appeal to investors who are troubled by the trading practices at many
mutual funds." See Kimelman, at 6.
8
See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 2-5.
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often quite low. Intraday trading and cheap prices are just two of the
appealing features of ETFs and account for the healthy, if unremarkable,
growth of ETFs in their first decade of existence.
In recent years, however, ETFs have enjoyed more explosive growth
thanks to the fact that ETFs are, by design, immune from many of the
vulnerabilities of mutual funds.9 ETFs began to soar following the mutual
fund industry's recent unpleasantness, beginning in September 2003, with
widespread regulatory investigations into questionable practices such as
market timing, late trading, front running, unfair valuation, and so forth.10
Although the mutual fund industry as a whole remains much larger than the
ETF industry, ETFs are growing at a far faster pace.11 The continued
development of ETFs will very much be a story of whether they
successfully improve upon the performance, integrity, and popularity of
mutual funds as both sets of funds compete for lucrative new sources of
investment from a common pool of investors.
Also fueling the boom of ETFs are several prominent financial
economists who endorse the use of these funds and, in some cases, hold
senior management positions with leading ETF sponsors.12 For instance,
Robert Shiller, author of Irrational Exuberance, is a backer of the fund
sponsor, Claymore MACROShares.13 His colleague at Yale University,
David Swensen, who oversees the University's outperforming endowment,
encourages the use of ETFs in his book, Unconventional Success.14 Jeremy
Siegel, a professor at the Wharton School of Business and the author of
Stocks for the Long Run, is an adviser to WisdomTree, an especially
innovative ETF sponsor.15 Burton Malkiel, the Princeton University
economics professor and author of the bestseller, A Random Walk Down
Wall Street, is also an enthusiast of ETFs.16 The support and zeal of such

9

See Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.C.
See, e.g., ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 8; Mark Hulbert, Why Mutual Funds Can't
Keep Prices Fresh, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at 7; Kimelman, supra note 7, at 6.
11
See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 10; ICI December 2007 Report, supra note 4.
12
See, e.g., John Authers, Exchange-Traded Funds Could Prove the Investment of Choice,
Unless Simplicity is Abandoned in the Race for Innovation, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 11, 2006,
at 24.
13
Id.; see also Press Release, Claymore MACROShares: A New Oil Investment Opportunity
(Nov. 30, 2006),
available
at
http://www.macromarkets.com/recent_news/articles/2006/11302006_ CMshares.pdf (explaining
Shiller's role as the architect of Claymore MACROShares).
14
DAVID SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS 206, 336-37 (2005).
15
See Authers, supra note 12, at 24.
16
See John Authers, Index Prophets Part Ways on ETFs, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 3,
2007, at 12. Professor Malkiel remarks that he is a proponent of ETFs: "'I've been a fan of index
funds since before index funds existed, so how could I not like ETFs?'" Id. (quoting Professor
Malkiel).
10
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well-known financial experts have certainly encouraged the astonishing
influx of both institutional and retail investment in ETFs.
By many accounts, the flow of assets into ETFs is projected to continue rising—to more than $2 trillion—in the next few years.17 That
forecast may increase dramatically, however, if ETF sponsors accomplish
two of the industry's largest goals. First, sponsors are attempting to
persuade the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to approve
several currently pending applications for a new species of actively
managed ETF.18 If, as has already begun to happen, the SEC does so,
actively managed versions of these funds could vault in popularity to
challenge the hegemony of the $12 trillion mutual fund industry.19 Second,
if ETF sponsors can convince administrators of 401(k) and other retirement
accounts—which hold savings of $2.5 trillion20—to adopt widespread use
of ETFs in their menu of investment options, as is also beginning to occur
already,21 these innovative investment vehicles may experience additional,
truly phenomenal expansion.22 Of course, with any success that fund
sponsors enjoy in increasing their assets under management, any perils or
shortcomings of these relatively untested investment funds will be
magnified commensu-rately.
When, from time to time, novel streams of financial speculation—
such as mutual funds, venture capital funds, private equity funds, and hedge
funds—branch off the enormous river of U.S. investment capital, these new
courses can take several decades to swell with popularity and establish a
recognized path. The speed and violence with which ETFs have burst forth,
however, threatens an entirely new wave of unpredictability and volatility.
Not every respected authority on investment funds finds this rapid
emergence of ETFs encouraging. John Bogle, who founded Vanguard and
pioneered the use of index funds, for example, is a strenuous detractor.23

17

Julie Segal, Piggybacking on the ETF Boom, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 2007, at

77.
18

Id.
See John Waggoner, A Half-Hidden Manager, USA TODAY, May 31, 2007, at 3B ("An
ETF managed by Legg Mason's superstar Bill Miller or Fidelity's Will Danoff, for example, might
become an instant hit.").
20
See Rebecca Knight, ETF Providers Take Aim at the Defined Contribution Market, FIN.
TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 23, 2007, at 8.
21
See Janet Kidd Stewart, 401(k) Options Worth Looking Over, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 2007,
at 7 (mentioning that "a handful of companies offer ETFs in their 401(k) plans" but "[t]hat number
is expected to grow as more providers enter the market").
22
See Knight, supra note 20, at 8.
23
See, e.g., JOHN C. BOGLE, THE LITTLE BOOK OF COMMON SENSE INVESTING 164-75
(2007). Bogle writes:
[T]he ETF is a trader to the cause of classic investing. I urge intelligent investors
to stay the course with proved strategy. While I can't say that classic indexing is
19
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Bogle and others fear that the largely untested ETFs suffer from intrinsic
vulnerabilities that make them poor repositories of so much new
investment.
So sudden has been the success of ETFs that industry analysts and
commentators have yet to conduct much of an examination into how these
funds will perform in a volatile and declining market, or to debate the utility
of any increase or decrease in the regulation of this industry by the SEC. In
fact, until recently, scholars have virtually ignored ETFs.24 By exploring
the advantages and shortcomings of these funds, this article seeks to
develop a descriptive and conceptual framework for a scholarly discussion
of ETFs as they gain ever-greater prominence, for good or for ill, in the
coming years. In addition, this article explores some of the implications of
the dramatic growth of ETFs, arguing that the mutual fund industry and its
dramatic scandals both provided the impetus for the growth of the ETF
industry and offer a vivid warning of the conflicts of interest and
vulnerabilities that may come to afflict these funds as they continue to
grow.25
Part II of this article expands upon the development and structure of
ETFs to explain precisely how they function. ETFs offer the same
possibility of immediate diversification that has contributed to the
popularity of mutual funds, but they also boast an innovative pricing
mechanism that allows ETF shares to be traded throughout the business day.
This pricing mechanism creates an arbitrage opportunity that both
encourages liquidity in the market for ETF shares and ensures an alignment
between the performance of a fund and its benchmark index. At the same
time, these unique internal dynamics present a challenge to the creation and
operation of an actively managed ETF. Because sponsors of ETFs, like
their mutual fund counterparts, are compensated in large part by the amount
of assets they manage, however, they have great financial incentives to
the best strategy ever devised, your common sense should reassure you that the
number of strategies that are worse is infinite.
Id. at 174.
24
One of the few law review articles discussing ETFs appears in a student note published
in 2004, prior to the industry's recent surge in growth. See Peter N. Hall, Bucking the Trend: The
Unsupportability of Index Providers' Imposition of Licensing Fees for Unlisted Trading of
Exchange Traded Funds, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (2004). Outside of the arena of legal
scholarship, financial and economic academics have published or posted a small number of articles
on the topic. See, e.g., Beatrice Boehmer & Ekkehart Boehmer, Trading Your Neighbor's ETFs:
Competition or Fragmentation?, Mar. 25, 2004, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=292128;
James M. Poterba & John B. Shoven, Exchange Traded Funds: A New Investment Option for
Taxable Investors (MIT Dep't of Econ. Working Paper No. 02-07, Nov. 26, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 302889.
25
For an analysis of the mutual fund industry and the recent allegations of malfeasance
against investment advisers of those funds, see William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An
Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2006).
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solve this challenge. This section of the article concludes with an
examination of the regulatory regime that currently governs ETFs.
Part III discusses the positive attributes of ETFs that have made them
such an attractive investment for hedge funds, institutions, and retail
investors. That section focuses on their trading flexibility, efficient operation and tax advantages, and the variety of their offerings in stocks, bonds,
currencies, commodities, and other unusual investments.
Part IV considers some of the drawbacks of ETFs, including many of
the potential problems that detractors fear will come to harm investors in
less exuberant economic times. The flexibility that comes with an ability to
trade ETFs on securities exchanges also ensures that they carry brokerage
fees, assessed with every purchase and sale, which make them particularly
unattractive for anyone who invests in regular installments or through
dollar-cost-averaging. That is, the transaction costs of ETFs may make
them unsuitable for some portion of the retirement account market.
Part V examines how ETFs have emerged as a salubrious market
response to the difficulties with mutual funds. The novel internal dynamics
of ETFs arm them with architectural protections from many of the inherent
weaknesses of mutual funds. Moreover, the emergence of an alternative
market solution is preferable to the imposition of several new regulatory
rules to try to correct the problems with mutual funds.
Part VI explores the implications for growth in the ETF industry,
particularly if fund sponsors ultimately succeed in developing ETFs that are
attractive to defined contribution plans or are able to persuade the SEC to
approve applications for actively managed ETFs. The expansion of this
new industry will almost surely not come without growing pains, and the
experience of mutual fund advisers may provide useful lessons for the
sponsors of exchange-traded funds. In particular, the conflicts of interest
that were such a source of weakness to mutual fund investment advisers
may also prove to be the source of future difficulties for ETF sponsors and
investors.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF ETFS
A. The Creation of Exchange-Traded Funds and Mutual Funds
On Friday, January 22, 1993, the first ETF commenced operations by
issuing 150,000 shares to be traded upon the American Stock Exchange
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(Amex).26 These shares, known as Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts
(SPDRs, pronounced "spiders"), represented ownership interests in an
investment trust which, in turn, held a portfolio of shares of common stock
in all the companies in the S&P 500, in substantially the same proportion as
the index.27 The fund had no affiliation with Standard & Poor's but,
acknowledging the importance of the S&P 500 as a bellwether of the
broader stock market, licensed the right to use the index's name and
composition.28 Accordingly, any investor who purchased a SPDR would, in
a single share, be invested in the entire S&P 500, and the value of that
SPDR would fluctuate in accordance with the rise and fall of the S&P 500.29
Seventy years earlier, Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS) had
created the first mutual fund—Massachusetts Investors Trust (MIT)—to
provide a similar opportunity for individuals to invest in a broad swath of
diverse securities through a single vehicle.30 MIT, like most mutual funds,
solicited investments from shareholders in exchange for shares in the fund.
Using those investment proceeds, the adviser of the fund, MFS, purchased a
portfolio of underlying securities for the fund. As with shares of ETFs, the
price of shares in MIT appreciates or declines as the aggregate value of the
fund's underlying portfolio rises or falls.31 The critical difference between
an ETF and a mutual fund, however, is in their respective methods of
pricing their fund shares.
Mutual funds are priced just once each day, after the close of
business.32 At that time, the fund's investment adviser calculates the value
of the fund's portfolio by multiplying the number of shares of each of the
securities it owns by the respective closing prices of those shares. That
aggregate product of the portfolio is then added to any cash or other assets
owned by the fund, while liabilities—such as fees owed to the adviser or

26

See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 20.
See id.
28
For a complete analysis of the legal issues surrounding the licensing of intellectual
property related to financial indices in the ETF industry, see Hall, supra note 24, at 1128. Hall
argues that "the index providers' practice of imposing licensing fees on secondary exchanges for
ETFs is without support in market regulation law, trademark law, or economic policy." Id.
29
See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 3 ("The value of SPDRs fluctuates in relation to
changes in the value of the [S&P 500] Portfolio.").
30
See Massachusetts Investors Trust, Registration Statement (Form N-1A) § IV (Feb. 27,
2004),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63091/000095015604000074/d604691. txt. "MFS is
America's oldest mutual fund organization. MFS and its predecessor organizations have a history
of money management dating from the founding of this fund in 1924." Id.
31
See id. § II, app. C, Equity Securities.
32
See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 161 (2004) (describing the structure and internal operation of mutual funds as well
as the incentives and conflicts of mutual fund managers and brokers).
27
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other service providers—are subtracted. The resulting sum is then divided
by the total number of shares issued by the mutual fund to calculate the net
asset value (NAV) of a single fund share. Clearly, this computation is made
much easier if one waits until the price of each portfolio security has ceased
fluctuating for the day.33
Although the companies that provide investment advice to mutual
funds may appreciate the comparative administrative ease of calculating a
price after the stock market closes, investors in the fund may not find the
prospect so attractive. For instance, if, shortly after the opening bell, a
remarkable piece of bad news sends the market into a precipitous fall
throughout the entire business day, a mutual fund investor can do no more
than place a sell order and ride the price of the fund all the way down until
the closing bell. Conversely, a mutual fund investor must react with similar
sloth to any good news. In either case, mutual funds, by their very
structure, stymie efforts to react expeditiously to dramatic changes in a
market during a business day.34
B. The Pricing Mechanism
Recognizing both the appeal of mutual funds as pools of diversified
investments as well as their pricing limitations, an employee of the Amex,
named Nathan Most, developed the mechanisms employed by the first
ETF.35 With the development of SPDRs, Most sought to provide investors
with an opportunity to invest in a diversified investment vehicle via shares
that traded at accurate prices throughout the business day.36 To do so, he
introduced creation units, large blocks of ETF shares (denominated in
groups of 50,000 shares or greater) that an ETF issues and redeems to
investors.37 Typically, only large institutional investors and brokerage
houses are capable of buying and selling such wholesale bundles of
investments, which may be worth several millions of dollars. Indeed, to
become eligible to trade directly with an ETF, an investor must enter into an
agreement to become an "authorized participant" (AP) in the fund.38

33

For a complete discussion of the structure and dynamics of mutual funds, including a
detailed description of the mutual fund pricing process, see Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1417-29.
34
See id.
35
See Obituaries, Nathan Most, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 12, 2005, at 57. Most's
obituary described him as "the inventor of the Exchange Traded Fund." Id.
36
See id.
37
See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 4; see also Exchange Act Release, supra note 6,
pt. I.B (defining ETFs and explaining that they are only sold and redeemed in very large
quantities).
38
See Ian Salisbury, Investing in Funds: A Monthly Analysis—Exchange-Traded Funds:
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Unlike mutual funds, ETFs do not sell and buy their creation units for
cash; instead, they require that these large institutional APs barter in-kind
baskets of portfolio securities in exchange for the creation units. Any AP
wishing to acquire a creation unit must therefore provide a "portfolio
deposit" equal in value to the NAV of all the ETF shares contained in the
creation unit. Before the market opens each day, the investment adviser or
sponsor of each ETF will declare the contents of the portfolio deposit,
which will largely replicate in microcosm the composition of the ETF's
overall portfolio. In order to purchase a creation unit of SPDRs, for
instance, an AP would need to provide a portfolio deposit consisting of a
representative collection of investments in the S&P 500.39
The transaction is reversed when an AP wishes to redeem ETF
shares. The AP must assemble the ETF shares into creation units and then
present them, bundled accordingly, to the fund in exchange for a
"redemption basket" of the fund's underlying portfolio securities.40 Thus,
cash does not generally change hands in the purchase and sale of ETF
shares between the fund and the largest investors—the APs—directly in
privity with the fund.
But why would anyone choose to exchange perfectly good S&P 500
securities for a synthetic approximation thereof? One reason an
institutional investor might do so would be to profit from a subsequent sale
to smaller investors who do not have the wherewithal to purchase such a
broad and expensive array of investments. Indeed, once institutional APs
purchase blocks of ETF shares in these initial transactions with ETFs, they
may then resell them on a securities exchange in a secondary transaction to
retail investors. For this service, large investors such as brokerage houses
can charge retail investors a transaction fee.41
For the retail investors, the shares in an ETF may, operationally,
behave in ways similar to shares of an operating company. For instance,
although it is possible for an investor to purchase shares of General Motors
(GM) directly from the company through an initial public offering, an
individual investor is far more likely to acquire and dispose of those GM
shares at negotiated prices in transactions with other GM investors on a
stock exchange. The investor will also pay brokerage fees for those
transactions.
Behind all the ETF Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2007, at R7 (noting that "there are 55
authorized participants across the ETF industry, including brokerage dealers like those of Goldman
Sachs and Merrill Lynch & Co. and specialists like Kellogg Group LLC and Susquehanna
International Group LLP").
39
See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 4; see also Exchange Act Release, supra note 6,
at pt. II.B.
40
See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 4.
41
Id.
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Note that not every ETF replicates the exact composition of its
benchmark index.42 Instead, a fund sponsor may attempt to track the index
using only a representative sample of the securities in that index.43 If, for
instance, a hundred stocks account for the overwhelming majority of the
performance of the S&P 500, an ETF tracking that index might more
efficiently attain its goals by trafficking in just that subset of securities.
These "sampling strategies" may provide the ETF with greater flexibility
and cost-effectiveness, though perhaps at the cost of perfect accuracy.44
C. The Utility of Arbitrage
The reciprocal treatment by ETFs of these two separate but parallel
currencies—ETF shares and the baskets of underlying index securities—
creates an arbitrage opportunity for the institutional investors who trade in
these investments. If, for example, an AP can pay less for 50,000 SPDRs
trading on a stock exchange to assemble a creation unit than to acquire all
the underlying S&P 500 stocks required in a portfolio deposit, then the AP
can make a quick profit by buying the 50,000 SPDRs, redeeming them with
the fund in exchange for a redemption basket of S&P 500 shares, and then
selling those S&P 500 securities on a stock exchange for cash. Conversely,
if the S&P 500 stocks are trading at prices lower than the SPDRs, the AP
can make a similarly quick profit by purchasing the S&P 500 stocks
required for a portfolio deposit, trading them to the ETF for a creation unit,
and then selling the 50,000 ETF shares contained in that creation unit on a

42

Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.A. Note also that not all ETFs track indices
that are weighted according to market capitalization. Many of the most innovative ETF sponsors
are launching funds "based on indices that weight companies by fundamental factors such as
dividends and earnings." Brewster, supra note 2, at 9. The philosophy of this so-called
"fundamentalist" approach to indexing is:
simply that over the long term, companies that pay dividends outperform
companies that do not. Therefore, an index based on dividend-paying companies
will outperform the S&P 500, which is weighed by the value of a company's
shares. It believes that indices weighted by market capitalization tend to
overweight overvalued companies and underweight the under-valued ones.
Id.
43
Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.A.
44
See, e.g., Simon Hildrey, On the Trail of Exchange Traded Funds, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Aug. 13, 2007, at 5; see also Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.A. The
Financial Times reports:
An ETF may opt for full or partial replication . . . . [U]nder full replication, all the
stocks in the index are held by the ETF. . . . Partial replication is used for a large
index such as MSCI World, in which an ETF may hold 60 to 70 per cent of the
stocks. . . . [T]his succeeds in reducing trading costs but means the performance
of the ETF may not fully match that of the underlying index.
See Hildrey, supra, at 5.
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stock exchange for a higher price.45
This potential for arbitrage provides institutional investors and
brokerage houses with a second incentive to provide liquidity to the ETF
market by purchasing and reselling ETF shares to retail investors. As we
have already seen, brokerage houses may charge transaction fees with each
purchase and sale of ETF shares, which also explains their presence in this
market.
But, perhaps most important for the success of ETFs, this arbitrage
mechanism places pressure on the pricing of ETF shares to track the
underlying index to which an ETF is benchmarked. An arbitrageur who
spies and attempts to exploit a deviation between the ETF and its
underlying index will, through the pressure created by the supply or demand
of buying or selling securities on open exchanges, force the two investments
back into line with one another. Historically, this pricing mechanism has
succeeded in ensuring that ETF shares do not trade at significant premiums
or discounts to their underlying indices.46 Most retail investors who do not
intend to arbitrage ETF shares acquire ETFs in order to replicate as closely
as possible these market indices. Therefore, the ability of arbitrage to
ensure that an ETF accurately tracks its benchmark is of extreme
importance.
D. Passive Indexing Strategies
A key component of the pricing and arbitrage mechanism of ETFs is
transparency. In order for any ETF investor—whether arbitrageur or retail
purchaser—to evaluate the accuracy of the price of ETF shares, the
composition of the ETF must be known publicly. That is, only by
comparing ETF shares to the corresponding prices of the underlying
portfolio securities that the ETF holds can one ascertain whether the ETF
shares are overpriced, underpriced, or accurately priced. Accordingly,
sponsors of ETFs publicly link their funds to established benchmarks, such
as the S&P 500.47 Every potential investor in SPDRs knows that the ETF is
attempting to replicate the performance and price of the S&P 500 stocks and
can evaluate the performance of the ETF on those terms.

45

See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 1-4.
See, e.g., id. at 9 (providing a chart that illustrates the very similar performance of SPDR
Trust shares and the underlying S&P 500 Index).
47
See Waggoner, supra note 19, at 3B. "For it all to work, big investors must be able to
calculate the value of the underlying stocks. ETFs typically show the value per share of their
holdings every 15 seconds. Large investors can quickly see whether it would be profitable to trade
ETF shares for the underlying stocks." Id.
46
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In the development of the ETF industry, the first funds linked
themselves to the broadest and most well-known benchmarks available in
the capital markets, such as the S&P 500, as we have seen, as well as the
Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Nasdaq-100 index, the Russell 3000, and
the Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index.48 But as the popularity of ETFs has
grown and the industry has saturated the most obvious benchmarks,
sponsors have increasingly begun to launch funds that track even more
arcane and narrow indices in niche sectors of the economy. In addition,
ETFs have expanded beyond indices of common equity securities to track
preferred shares, bonds, currencies, commodities, and futures.49 Today,
with over 500 different ETFs on the market, investors can use ETFs to
invest in the economy of Malaysia,50 the Swedish Krona,51 companies that
specialize in metabolic-endocrine disorders,52 and more.
E. Challenges of Active Management
The chief limitation of an index-based ETF—no matter how
specialized its index may be—is its ironbound connection to the index.
Even though active human management of a fund may be more expensive
than purely automated, passive investment programs, investors may
appreciate the timely intervention of a thinking and experienced portfolio
manager. So while an ETF indexed to residential real estate investment
trusts (REITs), for instance, must necessarily endure the woes associated
with subprime mortgages, the human portfolio manager of a mutual fund
operating in the same area could conceivably take steps to reduce the
mutual fund's exposure by, at a minimum, converting a significant portion
of the fund to cash. The ETF would necessarily ride the financial

48

See Tom Lauricella et al., Does this Innovation Make Sense?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007,
at R1 (discussing the array of "broad-market ETFs").
49
See, e.g., Kazuhiro Shimamura, Tokyo Stock Exchange Chases ETF Action—CommodityBased Funds Among Those Under Study, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2007, at C13; see also Henry
Smith, Smart Ways of Tracking Over the Shorter Term, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 2, 2007, at 12
(discussing the use of securities lending as a means of enhancing investment performance); John
Spence, Move Over ETFs, as ETNs Hit the Scene, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2007, at C17 (discussing
the creation of exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and their relative merits and limitations in
comparison to ETFs that also track currencies).
50
iShares MSCI Malaysia Index Fund, Prospectus, at 25-27 (Jan. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.ishares.com/material_download.jhtml?relativePath=/repository/material/download
s/ prospectus/ishares_inc_row.pdf&.
51
CurrencyShares Swedish Krona Trust, Prospectus, at 23-26 (June 23, 2006), available at
http://www.currencyshares.com/content/pdf/FXS-Prosp.pdf.
52

HealthShares Metabolic-Endocrine Disorders Exchange-Traded Fund, Prospectus, at 9196 (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.healthsharesinc.com/product/download_pdf/588.
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difficulties down in value, while the mutual fund could mitigate its losses.
Beyond the perceived advantages of human discretion demonstrated
by this example, active management also greatly expands the possible range
of investment strategies for funds. Because active management allows a
fund to be directed according to the investing philosophy of an individual
portfolio manager, there could, in theory, be as many different funds as
there are personal and idiosyncratic fund managers. The expansiveness of
active management may account in part for the fact that American markets
feature approximately 500 ETFs, which currently cannot be managed
actively, but over 8,000 mutual funds, which can.53
Perhaps not surprisingly then, ETF sponsors are attempting to
devise—and to secure SEC approval for—actively managed ETFs.
Multiple sponsors have filed applications with the SEC to launch actively
managed ETFs,54 and some industry analysts believe the SEC will soon
approve their use. Any sponsor hoping to create such an actively managed
ETF faces an inherent technical challenge, however, which the SEC has
been brooding over for many years. In fact, in 2001, the SEC published a
concept release soliciting suggestions on how to solve the central dilemma
of active management: the need to reconcile a portfolio manager's desire to
maintain secrecy over his or her investment strategy (which is, after all, the
service for which customers pay the manager) with potential investors'
demand for information necessary to evaluate the accuracy of the fund's
share price.55 After all, if investors do not know the composition of an
actively managed ETF, they cannot determine whether the trading price of
the fund's shares is fair. If, on the other hand, the manager publicizes his or
her holdings and strategy, what is to prevent other managers—or the
investors themselves—from simply replicating the strategy without paying
the portfolio manager?
In its currently pending application for actively managed Treasury
ETFs, one sponsor—Vanguard—has proposed a "sampling technique that
involves generating a basket of deposit securities that duplicates 40% to
50% of the securities held in the investment portfolios."56 Relying upon the

53

See generally Carla Fried, Exchange-Traded Funds, in a Rainbow of Choices, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2005, at 23 ("After all, it's not lost on marketers that more than 80 percent of
investor money still goes to actively managed mutual funds.").
54
Bear Stearns and Vanguard have both filed applications for actively managed ETFs. See
Thao Hua, Bear Stearns could land 1st active ETF on U.S. shores, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
Apr. 30, 2007, http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070430/PRINTSUB/7042
7058/1031/TOC.
55
Exchange Act Release, supra note 6 (evaluating the background of ETFs as well as the
SEC's analysis of possible benefits and detriments of permitting actively managed ETFs).
56
Diya Gullapalli, Moving the Market: Vanguard Makes Second Filing for "Actively
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liquidity of Treasurys, Vanguard asserts that the risk of such a fund's shares
trading at greater premiums and discounts than passively managed ETFs is
"only theoretical and unlikely to be realized given the predominantly 'plain
vanilla' portfolio holdings."57
F. Fund Sponsors
Given the similarities between mutual funds and ETFs, one might
expect the sponsors of the newer ETFs to be well-established investment
advisers of mutual funds. In fact, the two largest ETF sponsors—Barclays
Global Investors and State Street Global Advisors58—are relatively minor
players in the mutual fund arena. Vanguard, one of the preeminent mutual
fund advisers, has moved into third place in the ETF business, but only after
something of a late start.59 Because ETFs attract many of the same
investors as mutual funds, mutual fund advisers may have initially
considered them a threat or a product that would simply cannibalize existing
customers. But as ETFs have grown ever larger, they have become an
increasingly attractive business proposition to many mutual fund investment
advisers.
Perhaps because the business entities that create, establish, and
oversee ETFs do not actually provide investment advice to the funds—
rather, computer algorithms direct the buying and selling of fund shares in
accordance with funds' benchmark indices—they are known in the business
as "sponsors," not advisers. But, although management fees for these
passively managed funds are, on average, lower than actively managed
mutual funds, the ETF business is hardly a nonprofit enterprise. On the
contrary, the ETF business has proven extremely lucrative to Barclays and
State Street, whose management fees are applied to hundreds of billions of
dollars in assets under management. Multiplying one estimate of the
industry's average fee of 52 basis points, or 0.52%, by the total assets in
ETFs of approximately half a trillion dollars, we can estimate that the ETF
industry generates more than $2.5 billion in annual management fees for
fund sponsors.60 Given the industry's relatively low fees, however, sponsors
must operate large funds in order to realize material profits, which explains
Managed" ETFs, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007, at C3.
57
Id.
58
See Tom Lauricella, Fund Fight: State Street Aims to Reclaim its Past ETF Glory, WALL
ST. J., July 3, 2007, at R1 (discussing the competition between the two largest ETF sponsors, as
well as the third-place ETF provider, Vanguard Group).
59
Id.
60
See Eleanor Laise, Before You Drive that Hot ETF . . .; They're Spiffy and Alluring, But
an Owner's Manual is Essential for Novices, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2007, at R1 (citing a Morgan
Stanley estimate of the average expense ratio for a U.S. stock ETF).
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the significant first-mover advantage of Barclays and State Street.61 This
phenomenon may also explain why smaller ETF sponsors are attempting to
acquire permission for actively managed funds, whose comparatively higher
fees would allow sponsors to realize profits without having to acquire such
a large market share.
But management fees are not the only source of revenue for ETF
sponsors. With the portfolio deposits they receive from investors, ETFs
accumulate enormous reserves of portfolio securities. Sponsors can lend
these securities to other actors in the capital markets for a fee. Any investor
who wishes to sell a security short, for instance, will need to borrow shares
initially before replacing them at the conclusion of the short-sale
transaction. The fees from these lending programs can be—and often are—
used to boost the performance of the ETF or to compensate the sponsor,
depending on the terms of the ETF's underlying trust.62
On the other side of the ledger, ETF sponsors may be responsible for
discharging the expenses associated with operating a fund. To do so, they
typically use management fees to pay "the cost of transfer agency, custody,
fund administration, legal, and other services."63
G. State and Federal Regulation
ETFs are typically organized as business or statutory trusts under the
state laws of Massachusetts, New York, or Delaware,64 and then are
registered as investment companies under the federal securities laws.65 The
Investment Company Act of 194066 does not expressly contemplate ETFs,

61

See Smith, supra note 49, at 12.
Id.
63
Id.
64
In contrast, the mutual fund industry, which has historically and predominantly used
Massachusetts business trusts as the business entity of choice, the ETF industry prefers to use
Delaware statutory trusts for new funds. See Telephone Interview with Robert J. Borzone, Jr.,
Partner, Ropes & Gray LLP, in N.Y., N.Y. (Oct. 22, 2007).
65
See Shefali Anand, When an ETF is Not an ETF; Legal Structures and Regulators Can
Vary, While Tax Implications May Not Be Clear, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2007, at B1. The Wall
Street Journal reported:
The typical stock ETFs are set up under the same law as mutual funds—the
Investment Company Act of 1940, which has several requirements meant to
protect individual investors.
62

For instance, each fund or ETF must have a board with a majority of independent
directors, whose job is to watch over the fund's adviser on behalf of investors in
the fund.
Id.
66

Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64)
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so many ETF sponsors create their funds as either open-end funds or unit
investment trusts.67 In order to depart from the standard mutual fund
structure and to offer their distinctive feature of intraday pricing, ETF
sponsors first must obtain a variety of statutory exemptions from the SEC
for their funds.68

[hereinafter Company Act]. The Investment Company Act is often referred to as simply the
Company Act or the 1940 Act.
67
See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69
Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004).
68
See Diya Gullapalli, SEC to Hasten Process to Clear ETF Approvals, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 11, 2006, at C7 (discussing the SEC approval process and exemptive orders required by ETF
sponsors prior to launching a new fund).
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Normally, for instance, an investment company such as a mutual fund
is not permitted to redeem its shares only in wholesale blocks and must
instead redeem any amount of fund shares presented to the fund by an
investor.69 In order for ETFs to use creation units, therefore, they must
receive exemptive regulatory relief from the SEC. Similarly, an investment
company's shares are usually bought and sold only in transactions between
the company—typically, a mutual fund—and any individual or entity
wishing to invest in the fund.70 Thus, once again, an ETF must obtain
permission from the SEC in order to arrange for its shares to be traded on a
secondary stock exchange, such as Amex or NASDAQ. In addition, ETFs
also require permission to waive the requirement of providing every
individual purchaser of fund shares on those secondary exchanges with a
prospectus detailing the operation, risks, fees, and minutiae of the fund, as
is typically required when a mutual fund sells shares to an investor.71
By compiling this battery of regulatory exemptions, ETF sponsors
have carved out the regulatory space their funds need in order to offer
intraday pricing, and the SEC has willingly acceded to their requests. In
order to offer active management of ETFs, however, sponsors will require
additional exemptive relief, which the SEC has not yet seen fit to grant,
notwithstanding the Commission's having spent at least six years
considering the request nor expert predictions of imminent approval.
III. POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES OF ETFS
ETFs have burst onto the investing scene in just a few short years for
a variety of good reasons. Not only do they provide a similar degree of
access to investment diversification, they do so at competitive prices and
with the added benefit of intraday trading.
A. Flexibility and Exchange Trading
Perhaps the most immediately striking characteristic of ETFs is their
eponymous innovation: the ability to trade like a typical security throughout
the business day at real-time prices on a stock exchange. Prior to the advent
of ETFs, an investor seeking broad market or sector diversification via a
single investment instrument would be limited to mutual funds, which are
priced just once a day.72

69

See Company Act, supra note 66, § 11.
See id.
71
See id.
72
Closed-end mutual funds also trade on stock exchanges and therefore require similar
70
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The limits of mutual funds' system of "forward pricing," as it is
known, are manifest.73 Investors in mutual funds have no way of reacting to
positive or negative news during the business day. So, if shortly after the
opening bell, for example, the Federal Reserve were to unexpectedly lower
the federal funds rate on overnight loans between banks, thereby triggering
an immediate and sustained rise in the broader stock market, mutual fund
investors would be unable to participate in any general and sustained rise.
Instead, they would be forced to wait until the close of business that day to
purchase any shares in a mutual fund, at which point the gains would very
likely have already been incorporated into the price of the fund's shares.74
Conversely, if shortly after the opening bell, an earthquake were to
strike a major financial center, sending national and global markets into a
sustained decline, anyone invested in broad-based mutual funds would once
again be compelled to wait until the close of business to sell. Of course, by
that time, the shares of the mutual fund would have already sustained the
losses precipitated by the negative news and it would be too late for an
investor in those funds to avoid the decline.75
With ETFs, however, investors can react immediately to positive or
negative news by purchasing or selling ETF shares as soon as they receive
the information. Setting aside any limitations suggested by the efficient
capital markets hypothesis upon anyone's possibility of beating the market
in such circumstances,76 a savvy and responsive ETF investor may be able
to profit from rises or to avoid declines in the market through swift ETF
transactions.77 A SPDR will, for the most part, react to positive or negative
financial developments in just the same manner as the broader S&P 500,
providing intraday exposure to market fluctuations.
ETF shares resemble stocks and provide flexibility to investors in
other ways as well. Investors can, for example, place market, stop, or limit
orders on ETF shares, thereby exerting a good deal of precise control over
the purchases and dispositions of the holdings in their portfolios. In the
same way, investors may also sell ETF shares short in order to bet against
the movements of broad market indices or to hedge against the performance
of other holdings in their portfolios.78 Similarly, investors may purchase
exemptive relief from the SEC.
73
See Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1420-21.
74
See id.
75
See id.
76
See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 657 (2003) (providing a description of an ETF transaction).
77
See Ruth Sullivan, ETFs Increase in Popularity, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 20, 2007,
at 2 ("The number of institutional investors worldwide using exchange traded funds listed on
international exchanges has increased significantly in the past year.").
78
Id.
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ETF shares on margin and buy or sell options on ETF shares.79
B. The Array of Investment Options
The flexibility of ETF shares allows both institutional and retail
investors to use these funds in the construction of sophisticated and varied
portfolios.80
Because of the intraday pricing feature of ETFs, investors obviously
may use ETF shares to time market movements in order to bet on upward or
downward swings in stock exchanges. Similarly, institutional investors
holding uninvested cash during periods between investment activities—
such as private equity funds that have received but not yet invested the
funds of their limited partners—may choose to equitize that cash by using
ETF shares to invest the funds in broad market indices for short periods of
time.81
Moreover, the expanding array of ETFs provides ETF investors with
access not only to broad swaths of the marketplace, providing very easy
diversification, but also to exotic underlying investments that might
otherwise be inaccessible to relatively unsophisticated investors.82 For
example, ETFs now provide exposure to derivatives, futures,83 commodities,84 currencies,85 and preferred stock.86 Many retail investors may have
no other means of participating in such investments.87

79

See Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.C.
See Sullivan, supra note 77, at 2. Deborah Fuhr, a managing director at Morgan Stanley,
states: "[ETFs] are seen as offering low-cost beta and a good selection of exposure to international
and emerging market indices. They are also liquid and easy to understand." Id.
81
See Smith, supra note 49, at 12 ("ETFs are used by transition managers for equitising
cash or as short-term investment vehicles. And traders make use of ETFs for hedging their
investments in illiquid asset classes.").
82
For a discussion of the range and narrow focus of some recently launched ETFs, see Rob
Carrick, ETFs for Everyone, GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 23, 2007, at B15 (discussing funds that
specialize in preferred shares, down markets, valuable patents, and more).
83
See Smith, supra note 49, at 12 ("Like futures, ETFs trade in real time and can be
shorted. Unlike futures, they don't have maturities to be rolled over or margin requirements to be
taken care of.").
84
See, e.g., Shimamura, supra note 49, at C13 (discussing the creation of ETFs, such as
"the $1.4 billion Franklin Gold & Precious Metals Fund," which tracks the value of gold).
85
ETF sponsors have created a new and related investment product, called "exchangetraded notes," which specialize in currency speculation. See Spence, supra note 49, at C17
(discussing the creation of ETNs and their relative merits and limitations in comparison to ETFs
that also track currencies).
86
See Shimamura, supra note 49, at C13 (discussing the growing popularity of ETFs in
Japan, which has led to the launch of ETFs on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Asia's largest).
87
ETF sponsors may develop more funds that behave like the so-called "lifecycle funds" in
the mutual fund industry. See, e.g., Jeff D. Opdyke, Target-Date Funds Shake Up the Mix, WALL
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An investor may therefore easily use ETFs to construct a core-andsatellite portfolio, purchasing passive and broad-based ETFs in a diverse
pattern of asset allocation as the portfolio's core, while choosing more
specialized, niche ETFs as satellites in an effort to boost the portfolio's
performance.88
C. Efficiency and Costs
Because of the nature of their structure and management, ETFs
generally charge low fees and expense ratios, which further endear them to
investors.89 ETFs that passively track broad market indices have relatively
little need for management by human portfolio managers. In fact, the
composition of indices often remains unchanged for long periods, typically
varying only on those rare occasions when the index adds or removes a
stock. Accordingly, ETFs suffer very few of the transaction costs
associated with the turnover of portfolio securities, which is not the case
with mutual funds, particularly when such funds are actively managed.
In addition, ETFs do not conduct anything close to the number of
transactions with retail investors that mutual funds do.90 Mutual funds must
process all the purchases and redemptions of every single investor in their
fund, large or small; those transactions generate significant costs associated
with shareholder recordkeeping and managing accounts. ETFs, on the other
hand, conduct far fewer large scale transactions, with investors wealthy and
sophisticated enough to traffic in creation units, portfolio deposits, and
redemption baskets. All other transactions involving ETF shares take place
on secondary stock exchanges and, therefore, do not generate expenses that
ST. J., Aug. 30, 2007, at D1. The Wall Street Journal reported:
Target-date funds, also known as lifecycle funds, hold an ever-changing mix of
other stock and bond funds with the goal of serving as the only investment an
employee needs in a 401(k) plan. The closer the employee gets to retirement age,
the more conservative the fund's investments become, in theory locking in the
gains from an earlier, riskier mix of holdings in the fund.
Id.
88
See Eleanor Laise, The Risks of Betting Big on ETFs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2007, at B1
(discussing how investors can construct an entire portfolio comprising only of ETFs).
89
ETF fees are low in part because the costs to run an ETF are low, but also because ETF
sponsors compete aggressively for certain fund investors. See, e.g., Diya Gullapalli, ETF Price
War Looms as Vanguard Looks to Catch Up—New Product Takes Aim at Big Barclays Fund,
WALL ST. J., July 7, 2007, at B1. The Wall Street Journal reported:
In coming weeks, Vanguard Group plans to roll out an ETF designed to directly
undercut one of the biggest products on the market, from rival Barclays Global
Investors, a unit of Barclays PLC. . . . The Vanguard fund will have an expense
ratio of 0.15%, which is less than half the cost of the BGI fund.
Id.
90
See generally Karen Damato, For Index Funds, the Devil is in the Detail, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 7, 2004, at C1 (discussing fees, expenses, and cash-drag on mutual funds and ETFs).
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the fund must bear. Of course, those secondary transactions do involve
brokerage fees for investors, which is a cost of buying and selling ETF
shares not captured in the funds' expense ratios.
An investor who wishes to construct a long-term investment portfolio
from a large lump sum of savings can do so extremely cheaply and
efficiently with the purchase of relatively few ETFs. By acquiring
substantial amounts of enough ETF shares to satisfy the asset-allocation
requirements of sound portfolio theory, an investor might avoid iterative
brokerage fees and then take full advantage of the low management fees of
ETFs, which are, on average, lower than the expense ratios of mutual
funds.91
Each mutual fund and ETF will experience difficulty realizing an
identical or superior return compared to its benchmark index because,
unlike a theoretical index, real funds incur practical management and
operational costs that impose a drag on the funds' performance. ETFs
possess two attributes that enable them to offset some of this drag and to
boost their efficiency with respect to their underlying indices. First, unlike
benchmarks, ETFs can charge fees from lending their portfolio securities to
other market participants who would like to use those securities to, for
instance, engage in short-sale transactions. Second, in comparison to
mutual funds, ETFs can operate with far lower cash reserves on hand.
Mutual funds typically maintain a significant cash reserve of up to 5% to
use in redeeming any investor who wishes to sell shares back to the fund.
As we have seen, however, ETFs do not redeem their shareholders in cash
but, rather, in-kind through redemption baskets of portfolio securities. Any
fund that is more fully invested will experience less "cash-drag," which
gives another performance advantage to ETFs over mutual funds.92
D. The Tax Advantage
The pricing mechanism of ETFs not only allows for intraday trading
of fund shares, but also has the added benefit of providing shareholders with
extremely favorable tax treatment.93 To appreciate this tax advantage, first
consider the operations of a typical mutual fund: a mutual fund purchases
portfolio securities using the cash new investors pay into the fund, and then
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See id.
See id.
93
See Sara Robinson, Amex Considers Mutual Fund Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999,
at B8. "Exchange-traded funds are inherently tax-efficient. Because they create and redeem their
shares through the exchange of stock, rather than cash, they avoid distributing capital gains to
shareholders." Id.
92
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sells those securities either to pursue a particular investment strategy or to
redeem shareholders who wish to leave the fund. To the extent that the
value of portfolio securities have appreciated in value while owned by the
fund, these transactions are clearly realization events that may generate
considerable capital gains liabilities for the fund, which in turn distributes
those costs to shareholders of the fund.94
An ETF, on the other hand, grows primarily through the accretion of
in-kind portfolio deposits of underlying securities from investing
shareholders and then redeems those shareholders by returning securities in
redemption baskets. Unlike mutual funds, ETFs will rarely, if ever, alter
investment strategies and therefore, will rarely require direct purchases or
sales of portfolio securities.95 To the extent that any of the securities
contributed by investors to an ETF have significantly appreciated while
owned by the fund, the fund can prioritize the redemption of its securities to
rid itself of those with the highest potential unrealized capital gains first.
Then, if an ETF is for some reason obliged to sell any securities, its tax
liabilities will be minimized to the greatest extent possible. Accordingly,
ETFs incur comparatively few taxable purchases and sales of securities and,
in turn, pass fewer capital gains liabilities on to their shareholders.96
IV. LIMITATIONS OF ETFS
As the extraordinary growth of ETFs demonstrates, a great swath of
the investing public has been largely persuaded of the many compelling
attributes of ETFs. But not everyone is convinced. As ETFs have gained
greater prominence, investing experts such as John C. Bogle have begun to
point out shortcomings with these funds.97 Moreover, as the rapid
expansion of ETFs has begun to saturate the market, fund sponsors are
launching increasingly exotic species of funds, the growth of which has
prompted a fresh wave of criticism.98
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See id.
See James J. Eccleston, Nothing Alien about ET Funds, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 8,
1999, at 6. "ETFs can satisfy redemptions by investors much more favorably than mutual funds by
being able to transfer out securities in-kind to the redeeming investors." Id.
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See id.
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For an extensive discussion of the potential perils of investing in ETFs, see Laise, supra
note 60, at R1 (discussing potentially cheaper investment options, layers of complex trading costs,
potential investor confusion from the wide array of ETFs, tracking error, the lack of performance
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A. Comparing the Total Performance of ETFs and Mutual Funds
Although ETFs have quickly garnered a reputation as cost-effective
investments, they are certainly not without fees and expenses of their own.99
As we have seen, the sponsor of every ETF charges a management fee for
running the fund.100 Although these fees are for the most part relatively
low, they are not negligible for every ETF. Indeed, some ETFs that
specialize in rather unorthodox investments, such as illiquid fixed-income
securities or extremely narrow sectors containing only a few issuers, may
charge management fees of well over 100 basis points.101
In addition, the fact that retail investors must buy and sell ETFs on
exchanges means that those investors will have to pay brokerage fees.102
Although brokerage fees can be amortized into relative insignificance if an
investment is held for many years, such fees may impose a prohibitive
expense on retirement accounts or commendable investment strategies such
as dollar-cost averaging.103 Any type of savings strategy that involves
purchasing a relatively small amount of investments at regular intervals may
be incapable of overcoming the costs of ETF brokerage fees.
Buying ETFs—or, indeed, any investment whose price is negotiated
on an open exchange—also means that ETF investors bear the burden of
absorbing costs that result from bid-and-ask spreads—that is, the "gaps
between the price buyers are willing to pay and sellers are willing to
accept."104 These spreads are typically exacerbated when the market
undergoes unusual volatility and may be suffered most keenly by smaller or
more specialized ETFs whose shares experience thin trading volume.105
In some respects, discussions regarding the dynamics of ETF fees are
needlessly abstract.
Particular factors—such as structure and
management—certainly may explain how and why ETFs' fees are often
lower than corresponding mutual funds. And other factors—such as trading
fees—may explain why the cost of ETF investing may be higher than one
expects. But surely only one consideration matters in the final analysis: the
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empirical results of ETF performance.
The Wall Street Journal recently commissioned Morningstar to
conduct just such a study comparing the performance of some of the largest
and most well-known ETFs with mutual funds offering similar investment
strategies. The report concluded:
Big, low-cost index funds from Boston-based Fidelity Investments and Vanguard Group Inc., Malvern, Pa., outperformed
the ETFs in most of the comparisons we set up. For the 40
time periods studied, the mutual funds prevailed in 34—
including a sweep of the one-, three-, and 10-year after-tax
categories.106
What may be more remarkable about these results is that the mutual funds
outperformed the ETFs before taking into account the brokerage fees that
investors must pay to buy and sell ETFs on stock exchanges—fees that are
typically absent from mutual fund transactions.107
With the panoply of structural advantages that allows ETFs to
function with such operational efficiency and inherent tax advantages, how
is it possible that they failed to outperform mutual funds?108 First, note that
only the highest-performing mutual funds did better than ETFs.109 Those
mutual funds are operated in ways very similar to ETFs; that is, they are
linked to broad market indices and passively managed.110 Most mutual
funds—which are actively managed—have expense ratios higher than the
average ETF.111
Second, as with ETFs, the investment advisers of mutual funds can
also use strategies such as stock lending to boost their funds' performance
and, moreover, "may have a greater incentive to try to earn back a portion
of their expenses."112 Because ETFs are widely purchased by institutional
investors attempting to hedge against the market,113 the sponsor of an ETF
may believe that "outperformance of all other index funds can take a
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Ian Salisbury, A Close Race, a Surprising Finish; Against Sleek ETF Rivals, Top Index
Mutual Funds Use Ultra-Low Costs to Gain Performance Edge, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2007, at R1.
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Id.
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See Salisbury, supra note 106, at R1.
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Id. ("ETFs do have low costs when judged against mutual funds across the board, many
of which have higher expenses because they employ a staff of analysts to pick stocks.").
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See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 77, at 2.
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backseat to predictability of the return."114 Indeed, a spokeswoman for
Barclays notes that "[o]utperforming the index is not going to do any good
for short sellers."115
Third, unlike ETFs, mutual funds can "buy[] stocks ahead of anticipated additions to their index."116 But, as a senior manager at State Street
Global Advisors points out, aggressive mutual fund managers who adopt
such techniques incur additional risk absent from ETFs in order to boost
their performance.117 And "[w]hile tactical moves may improve results one
year, they can just as easily backfire the next."118
The surprise of this study is that the very best performing mutual
funds can outperform ETFs. But one of its other findings is that the
average ETF with a given investment strategy outperforms the average
correspond-ing mutual fund.119 Perhaps this conclusion suggests that while
an informed investor may be able to do better than ETFs by selecting the
very best mutual funds, the uninformed investor is more likely to find
higher performance amongst typical ETFs than with typical mutual funds.
B. Short-Term Speculation
What bothers John C. Bogle most about ETFs is the myopic and
harmful investing behavior that he believes they encourage amongst
investors.120 He concludes that "if long-term investing was the paradigm for
the classic index [mutual] fund, trading ETFs can only be described as
short-term speculation."121 The ability to trade a fund intraday is less a
useful tool than a dangerous temptation to engage in day trading, he
argues.122 More-over, trading has overtaken diversification as "the driving
force in the ETF world," he insists, citing advertisements for SPDRs, that
promised: "Now, you can trade the S&P 500 all day long, in real time."123
Emotions, Bogle suspects, encourage "performance-chasing
investors" to become their own worst enemies.124 Citing some of the higher
performing funds of late, he states that the "annualized share turnover of
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Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Salisbury, supra note 106, at R1.
119
Id.
120
Bogle, supra note 102, at A11.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Bogle, supra note 102, at A11.
115

96

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 33

these sectors averages an astonishing 2500%."125 Bogle does not explain
what proportion of this turnover is attributable to the investment strategies
of professional and institutional investors such as hedge funds and what
proportion is attributable to the retail investors for whom he expresses
concern.
Overlooking the generality of his grievance, Bogle does helpfully
point out this vulnerability for ETFs. While mutual funds suffered from
their architectural weaknesses (which permitted market timing, late trading,
and other deleterious behavior), ETFs are also inherently at risk: the ability
to trade ETFs all day long may tempt rapid and unsuccessful day trading by
overly optimistic retail investors.126 Of course, the performance of
investments in a mutual fund also can be—and has been—harmed by rapid
trading.
C. Saturation and Niche Volatility
As the number of ETFs on the market has ballooned in recent years,
sponsors seeking to bring new funds to the market have been forced to
choose whether to compete with well-established funds indexed to wellknown benchmarks or to offer more specialized funds that track
increasingly narrow niche indices. Although sponsors have done both, the
increasing availability of myriad arcane and narrow funds has created the
most consternation amongst industry observers.127 The Wall Street Journal
reports:
Critics have warned in recent months that ETF companies'
efforts to distinguish themselves with new products have led to
offerings that are too narrowly focused for most small
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Id.
Bogle does concede that, when used appropriately, ETFs may perform just as well as
broad-based index funds. "In fairness, if they are not traded, they can often be the equal of the
classic index funds." Id.
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See, e.g., Steven Syre, ETF Market Takes Off, but Wealth of Choices Makes Investors
Wary, BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 2007, at E1. "'This is an industry that has had Miracle-Gro
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newsletter for exchange traded fund investors. 'There are just too many products out there.'" Id.
See also Carrick, supra note 82, at B15. Carrick reports:
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the new products they're introducing. "They're using a 'throw it against the wall
and see what sticks approach,'" said Tyler Mordy, head of research at Hahn
Investment Stewards and editor of a publication called ETFocus. "It's getting
ridiculous."
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investors' purposes. Many ETFs are praised for their broad
diversifica-tion of holdings, but with more than 500 offerings
today, the inexperienced can be tempted to play tiny niches, a
potentially dangerous tactic.128
Bogle also complains that these new funds contradict the benefits of diverse
index investing. "[S]urely holding small segments of the market offers less
diversification and commensurately more risk," he observes.129
The narrower a fund becomes, the fewer underlying securities may be
available for inclusion in its portfolio.130 This lack of diversification can
cause the ETF to behave more like an individual stock than like a mutual
fund. In a narrow sector, one particular operating company may account for
a dominant market share, and therefore, its performance may impose a
disproportionate impact on the returns of any ETF invested in that sector.
Moreover, when only a few companies operate in a particular investment
sector, ETFs and other investment funds attempting to invest in that sector
may drive the price of those companies artificially higher, not because of
faith in the value of any particular company, but simply because of the need
to hold those shares in the fund. Similarly, the creation of ETFs to track the
value of commodities such as silver and gold has driven up the price of
those holdings.131 The securities of esoteric investment niches, such as
foreign issuers or micro-cap companies, are also more likely to be traded
with only thin volume and are thus susceptible to the volatility of dramatic
price swings.132

128
Diya Gullapalli, As ETFs Seek Niches, Risks Rise; Returns Are Often at the Top of the
Performance Rankings—and the Bottom, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2007, at R1.
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See, e.g., Carolyn Cui & James T. Areddy, The World Melts for Gold, WALL ST. J.,
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adding volatile new dynamics to the market.")
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See John Spence, Boom Time for ETFs Prompts Questions; Fast Growth Worries Some,
Especially as More Funds Target Narrow Sectors, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2007, at C13. The Wall
Street Journal reports:
Many of the new products tend to track areas of the market that have done well
recently, but when the inevitable downturn hits, investors may run for the exits.
As a result, ETFs with smaller asset pools run by niche providers may be forced
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With this combination of vulnerabilities, a Morningstar researcher
has observed that the proliferation of increasingly specialized ETFs may be
"just a more cost-effective means of producing a bad investor
experience."133
D. Lack of a Track Record
The ETF industry, as a whole, is still quite immature, having existed
for fewer than fifteen years. Moreover, the vast majority of ETFs currently
available have come to market in just the past two years. Investors seeking
to invest in ETFs then, may have a very difficult time finding meaningful
track records to examine prior to investing in a fund.134
Indeed, the two leading researchers of funds, Morningstar and Lipper,
do not even rate ETFs that are less than three years old.135 Thus, the
majority of funds in this industry are not professionally rated by the
industry standards. Without professional guidance, retail investors will be
left largely to their own, untrained devices in researching ETFs for
investment.136
Any ETF sponsor incapable of providing a concrete record of results
over a significant period of operations is offering more a promise than a
demonstrable business model. Assumptions may be proven incorrect over
time, while certain sponsors may prove more adroit at minimizing bid-ask
spreads or boosting fund performance through stock-lending programs.
Only after viewing several years of results will an investor have a realistic
sense of the expertise of the management of a particular fund and appreciate
the difference between theoretical indices and actual investment results.
E. Tracking Error
Perhaps the most fundamental shortcoming of any ETF is its failure
Group Inc.] said, "could leave a black eye for the ETF industry."
Id.
133
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to adhere reliably to the index to which it is purportedly benchmarked.137
Should SPDRs cease to replicate the S&P 500, for instance, they would stop
serving as a useful investment alternative to the S&P 500 and undermine
much of their raison d'être. Yet management fees, taxes, and other subtle
sources of investment friction create a divergence between the performance
of every ETF and its benchmark. Thus, it is less the existence and more the
magnitude of this tracking error that should concern an investor.138
Tracking error will vary from fund to fund, based on the particular
way in which a fund is managed and may therefore distinguish even ETFs
that purport to track the very same index. The Financial Times explains
this by way of example:
For example, Lipper calculates that the Lyxor CAC 40 ETF
had an annualized tracking error of 2.33 per cent in 2005 and
1.99 per cent in 2006. In contrast, the Indexis ETF tracking
the same index recorded annualized tracking errors of 5.44 per
cent and 4.16 per cent for 2005 and 2006 respectively, while
the EasyETF CAC 40 registered 4.29 per cent and 2.24 per
cent.139
Various factors influence the degree of tracking error in an ETF. First, a
fund may choose to replicate the entire composition of its underlying index
or to use only a representative sample of those securities in its portfolio.
Although the latter approach may be more cost-effective, it can obviously
lead to a greater divergence in performance. Sometimes, full replication
may be impossible: if an index includes a stock that accounts for 50% of the
index, for instance, ETFs may be barred from investing anywhere near that
level of its portfolio in that stock by SEC or self-imposed rules that require
greater diversification.140
Second, currency fluctuations may create a disparity in returns for a
benchmark comprising only foreign stocks if the fund itself is denominated
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in U.S. dollars.141
Third, the particular costs a fund incurs will create greater or lesser
drag on the fund's performance. Thus, "[t]racking error will be affected by
transaction costs, custody costs, the foreign exchange impact of investing in
overseas securities and differences in the timing of dividend payments,
among other factors."142
Tracking error may be most pronounced during volatile markets, such
as those of this recent summer.143 The Wall Street Journal reports that
"[w]hile the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index dropped roughly 9% in the
month ended Aug. 16, many ETFs produced double-digit gains or
losses."144 Funds that engage in leverage to increase their returns, either
positively or negatively, are particularly vulnerable to tracking error.145
The novelty of ETFs has, in many respects, disguised some of their
limitations. While many of their positive attributes have been intuitively or
immediately obvious, their weaknesses have tended to emerge only over
time, as different cycles in the market have placed ETFs under different
kinds of pressure. In addition, the explosive expansion of this industry has
created large numbers of new funds that are squeezing into increasingly
narrow investment niches and looking less and less like the prototypical
broad-based index fund. As the industry matures and develops a track
record for these hundreds of new offerings, the true range of their
vulnerabilities will become more apparent.
V. A POSITIVE MARKET RESPONSE TO MUTUAL FUNDS
In the first decade of their existence in the United States, ETFs grew
steadily to approximately 120 funds and $150 billion in assets.146 Then, in
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September 2003 (the tenth anniversary of ETFs), New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer announced an investigation into the possible illegal
market timing of mutual funds.147 That press conference triggered several
years of exhaustive regulatory investigations into almost all aspects of the
mutual fund industry, leading to billions of dollars in payments by
investment advisers to the SEC and state regulatory bodies to settle
allegations of widespread malfeasance. Those investigations, in turn,
prompted the SEC staff to draft a raft of new regulations to address the
shortcomings of mutual funds and caused academics to explore much of
what went wrong in the industry.148
The thoroughgoing unpleasantness in the mutual fund industry also
triggered a rapid acceleration in the growth rate of ETFs as mutual fund
investors fled possibly tainted investment products for the perceived safety
of ETFs.149 Rather than waiting for the new regulations to fix mutual funds,
ETF investors viewed these new funds as a salubrious market response to
the failure of mutual funds.
Indeed, the structure and operation of ETFs endow them with many
characteristics that render them immune to several of the most notorious
vulnerabilities of mutual funds, such as market timing, late trading, unfair
valuation, and hidden fees and expenses.150
A. Market Timing
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exchange-traded funds, which track stock and bond indexes, have been conspicuously immune to
these problems." Id.

102

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 33

Perhaps the most well-known allegation made by the SEC and state
regulators against the investment advisers of mutual funds was that the
advisers were complicit in market timing their own funds. Because mutual
funds are priced just once a day, typically at the close of the New York
stock markets at 4:00 p.m. eastern time, some funds may use stale prices for
their underlying securities when calculating the fund's NAV.151
Consider, for instance, a mutual fund that invests in stocks on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). At 4:00 p.m. eastern time, the TSE has been
closed for fourteen hours—with another four hours to go before it
reopens—and therefore, the prices of TSE stocks will not have changed
during that time. If, however, Japan has experienced extremely positive or
extremely negative financial news during the fourteen hours between the
close of the TSE and the calculation of the U.S. mutual fund's daily NAV,
the price the mutual fund charges for its shares will be either far too high or
far too low, at least until the shares are priced again the next day using fresh
prices from the TSE. Cognizant of this vulnerability in mutual fund pricing,
sophisticated institutional investors such as hedge funds sought to move
large amounts of cash in and out of mutual funds quickly to profit through
this time zone arbitrage. Thus far, this kind of market timing is not per se
illegal.152
In their public prospectuses, however, many mutual funds avowed
policies against allowing the timing of their funds.153 Market timing was
often voluntarily prohibited by investment advisers because market timing
greatly complicates the operation of funds by portfolio managers, who must
scramble to invest or divest large blocks of stocks to accommodate
institutional market timers, and because market timing dilutes the returns of
long-term fund investors in favor of short-term investors who capture
immediate returns from their timing activity. Regulators alleged that
investment advisers, in contravention of their publicly filed prospectuses,
nevertheless permitted large institutional investors to market time their
mutual funds in exchange for particular forms of payment to the adviser. In
these illicit quid pro quo arrangements, market timers would typically make
and hold large investments in certain other funds advised by the same
investment adviser, who would receive management fees therefrom to offset
any administrative difficulties in the time fund. Whereas the investment
adviser was compensated for its trouble in this scheme, the other, long-term

151

See Hulbert, supra note 10, at 7 (discussing the appeal of ETFs as an alternative to
mutual funds and their limitations).
152
See Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1455.
153
See id.

2008]

THE FORTUNES AND FOIBLES OF EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS

103

investors in the timed fund were not.154
A fund whose shares are priced constantly throughout the day and
react more or less immediately to publicly disclosed information—such as
good or bad news in the Japanese economy—cannot be market timed. An
ETF is just such a fund. The practice of market timing relies upon the
forward pricing scheme to calculate the NAV of mutual funds and the use
of stale prices in that computation. The inherent pricing scheme of ETFs
simply does not permit this kind of timing arbitrage. Furthermore, as
Professor Burton Malkiel has pointed out, the rapid timing of purchases and
redemptions of ETF shares by sophisticated institutional investors has no
effect on—and certainly does not hurt—other investors in the fund.155
B. Late Trading
Another allegation made against mutual fund investment advisers was
that, again in exchange for compensation, they allowed favored clients to
late trade their funds.156 Unlike market timing, late trading is per se illegal,
no matter what a fund's prospectus might purport to allow or to prohibit.157
Late trading involves placing an order to buy or sell mutual fund shares
after 4:00 p.m., when the markets have closed and the price of fund shares
has been calculated.158
Not only does late trading allow investors to know exactly whether a
fund's price has dropped (making it a good day to buy) or risen (making it a
good day to sell), but it also allows investors to react to any financial news
that arises after the close of business.159 If, for instance, dramatically negative news is announced at 4:01 p.m., any investor who placed a sell order on
mutual fund's shares for that day would escape from the fund before the
price fell the next day to reflect the bad news.160 And, similarly, buying
after learning of good news would enable an investor to acquire fund shares
for an artificially low price and to generate immediate profits if the shares
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were then sold shortly thereafter.161
But how is late trading possible if mutual fund orders must be made
before 4:00 p.m., and fund shares are priced at 4:00 p.m.? In fact, the
technical and recordkeeping steps necessary to process mutual fund
transactions take several hours to administer, as information on purchase
and sale orders is gathered from brokerage houses across the country and
aggregated by the fund's back-office administrators.162 During that time,
complicit intermediaries can "lose" or "find" orders favorable to important
clients, if they so choose.163
Again, the radically different pricing apparatus of ETFs insulates
them against this kind of machination. Only the slow, cumbersome process
of aggregating and calculating client orders renders mutual funds
susceptible to this kind of manipulation. The trading of ETF shares happens
almost instantaneously on stock exchanges continuously throughout the
day, making the process far more transparent and free from manipulation.164
C. Fair Valuation
If a mutual fund holds in its portfolio an underlying investment that is
highly illiquid, the process of determining the fund's NAV quickly becomes
complicated.165 Consider, for example, a mutual fund that invests in a
small, private company—perhaps a recently founded technology venture.166
Since the shares in that company do not trade publicly, investors such as
the mutual fund can determine the shares' value only occasionally, perhaps
when the company holds a new round of financing or when the company
commissions an external auditor to make an appraisal.167 In the weeks,
months, or years between those valuation events, the last-known price of the
company's stock may become very stale.
If during that time the company has successfully prosecuted a new
patent, for instance, the value of its shares will almost certainly have
increased, notwithstanding the unchanged and artificially low last-known
price.168 Similarly, if the company has become the target of serious litigation, the value of its shares will very probably have decreased, again
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notwithstanding the artificially high last-known price.169 Because mutual
fund advisers are compensated by management fees that are computed as
function of the assets they manage, an artificially high calculation of those
assets will lead to inappropriately high management fees for the investment
adviser.170 Accordingly, investment advisers are legally obliged to "fair
value" the investments in their portfolio, if reliable market prices are not
available.171
The fair valuation process may involve using third-party appraisers,
reasonable proxies, or computational models to derive a current and more
reasonable value for rarely priced investments.172 Of course, this backup
valuation process often involves a certain degree of judgment and
discretion. Another of the charges leveled against mutual fund investment
advisers in the late imbroglio was that they exercised this judgment in their
own favor and to the detriment of shareholders in the fund.173
ETFs avoid the perils of unfair valuation by trafficking in publicly
traded investments.174 Any investor who wishes to purchase a creation unit
from an ETF must, of necessity, present the fund with a basket of securities
representing the overall holdings of the ETF.175 All the participants in this
system will, therefore, be cognizant of recent and reliable prices for each of
the ETF's component investments. The fund sponsor will not be at liberty
to substitute its self-interested judgment to compute the NAV of the ETF
and thereby charge an artificially inflated management fee.
D. Hidden Fees and Expenses
Because mutual funds handle a variety of administrative tasks
associated with their funds' investors, they charge a variety of fees.176
Mutual funds or their agents are responsible for tracking the purchase and
sale of all fund shares, for generating statements to investors, for
maintaining safe custody of the fund's assets, and for promoting the sale of
fund shares to intermediaries such as brokers and dealers.177 For each of
these services, mutual funds charge transfer agency fees, account
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maintenance fees, custodian fees, 12b-1 fees, and more.178 Occasionally,
mutual fund advisers opt to waive some of these fees for limited periods.179
Accordingly, the fee and expense table contained in the prospectus of a
typical mutual fund which must record all these permutations can be an
extraordinarily convoluted read.
ETFs, by contrast, are relatively free from layers of disparate fees.
Often, they charge only a single management fee, from which they
discharge any and all of their operational obligations. This one fee makes
pricing comparison amongst ETFs comparatively straightforward for
investors.
Even as a bullish market has dissipated much of the negative press
surrounding mutual funds since 2003, ETFs remain more attractive to many
who might previously have invested in mutual funds, and these newer funds
now attract the majority of new investments in indexed investment funds.180
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF ETFS
As the ETF industry continues its dramatic debut and rapid march
upon the $2 trillion mark, which some analysts believe it will reach by
2010, two possible developments may place even greater importance upon
the study of positive and negative attributes of ETFs. First, administrators
may grant ETFs access to the menus of investment options available to
investors in retirement accounts, such as pensions, 401(k)s, and other
defined contribution plans. Second, the SEC may grant applications that
have already been filed by fund sponsors for the formation of actively
managed ETFs. Should either or both of these eventualities come to pass,
the amount of money—and, perhaps more importantly, the proportion of
retirement savings—invested in these new investment vehicles will grow
even more rapidly. The effect of this additional stress on a largely untested
industry is a matter of conjecture but, if the elder siblings of ETFs—mutual
funds—are any guide, the ETF industry may soon become the scene of
crime and punishment.
A. Gaining Access to Retirement Accounts
Currently, $2.5 trillion are invested in retirement savings accounts.181
Those accounts are typically overseen by a plan administrator, who
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chooses what investments to include in a menu of choices for plan
participants. Mutual funds have long dominated this field, and most 401(k)
plans, for example, provide employees with a choice of funds in which to
invest. If a fund sponsor can persuade the administrator to include ETFs in
the relatively limited choice of options, ETFs would almost certainly enjoy
a rapid increase in assets under management. To date, however, two
impediments have stood in the way of the inclusion of ETFs: the presence
of mutual funds and the brokerage fees associated with ETFs.
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ETF sponsors will need to persuade plan administrators that ETFs can
offer plan participants something that mutual funds cannot.182 One of the
chief selling points of ETFs—their ability to trade rapidly and in real
time—may be unlikely to impress trustees who are charged with overseeing
plans intended to safeguard retirement assets for the long term. In addition,
the 8,000 mutual funds currently on the market provide an equal if not
greater number of investment options as the 500 ETFs available.
Similarly, brokerage fees may be an additional expense that
retirement plan administrators will not wish to impose upon their plans'
participants. Currently, many investment advisers offer no-load mutual
funds, which investors can purchase and redeem without paying transaction
fees.183
But the allure of this potential market is a powerful one. The retirement market is large and may soon expand considerably. The recent
Pension Protection Act of 2006184 authorized plan administrators to switch
the default on participants' accounts from uninvested to invested. That is,
previously, any employee who saved money to a retirement plan would be
required to make an affirmative choice to have those funds invested in
anything other than cash or a money market account. But many employees
are either too busy or unsophisticated to manage their retirement accounts
effectively.185 Accordingly, large amounts of retirement assets sat
uninvested. With this new federal legislation, however, plan administrators
can arrange to have funds invested in a relatively conservative set of broadbased index funds. This legislation is likely to improve the return on the
savings of many future retirees, though it also has a healthy effect on the
profits of those default index funds' investment advisers.
Given these substantial financial incentives, ETF sponsors are
diligently lobbying plan administrators to add ETFs to their fund menus.186
In that effort, some sponsors have taken steps to reduce or eliminate the
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brokerage fees associated with their funds, so as to remove impediments
from dollar-cost averaging. These efforts appear to be making some sort of
headway, as some administrators have begun to acquiesce.187
B. Securing Permission to Offer Actively Managed ETFs
Active management is another source of possible growth in the ETF
industry.188 In the mutual fund context, the vast majority of funds are
actively managed, even though there are a significant number of passive
index funds also. Many market analysts project that the number of ETFs
and the amount of assets invested therein would both jump dramatically if
the SEC authorized the use of active management. As we have seen, active
management faces a number of technical difficulties in the ETF context—
chiefly, the ability to reconcile a fund manager's interest in keeping the
fund's composition and investment strategy secret with the need for
investors to know whether the price of fund shares accurately reflects the
value of the fund's portfolio.189
The pending applications—filed by Vanguard, among others—
propose sampling strategies that would disclose a substantial proportion of
the fund. Claiming that the disclosed portion would be representative of the
undisclosed portion, the sponsors argue that investors can thereby evaluate
the value of the entire portfolio without knowing every detail about the
fund's composition and strategy. To date, these applications have been
made for funds that would track Treasury securities, which are relatively
fungible and, the applicants suggest, ideal ingredients for this kind of
ETF.190
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Again, despite obstacles, ETF sponsors are aggressively pursuing
expansion into untapped new fields of assets that active management would
make available. The existing pattern of ETF growth, when combined with
the possibility of successfully gaining entrance to retirement accounts and
the market for active management, suggests that the ETF industry will
continue its breakneck expansion.
C. Future Vulnerabilities from Conflicts of Interest
What can we expect from this future growth? If all goes well, ETF
entrepreneurs will be rewarded for developing a helpful new means of
investment, and investors will indicate their satisfaction with the services
ETFs provide by sending their assets to them to satisfy a wide variety of
investing needs. But perhaps it is naïve to assume that such explosive
growth will occur without growing pains. Indeed, it is difficult to forget
that ETFs owe a significant portion of their popularity and success to the
debacles of their older siblings, mutual funds. Perhaps the experience of
difficulties in the mutual fund industry might provide instructive warnings
for the ETF industry.
The unifying theme of the allegations of malfeasance in the mutual
fund industry was the investment advisers' decision to succumb to the
temptations created by conflicts of interest. When confronted by institutional investors who wished to market time mutual funds, for instance,
investment advisers were forced to choose between the financial health of
long-term investors in those funds and their own revenues, which the
market timers were promising to increase. Similarly, late trading also
involved a quid pro quo between investment advisers and the investors who
asked those advisers to abet illegal trading in exchange for increased assets
under management, which led directly to increased revenues from
management fees.191
One of the great successes of the ETF industry has been the ability to
create a market—rather than a regulatory or litigated—solution to much of
the mutual fund difficulties. Nevertheless, ETFs are not free from their own
possible conflicts of interest. One particular source of vulnerability
involves the stock lending plans, whereby ETFs lend their stocks to other
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market participants in exchange for a fee. Since many ETFs hold
themselves out as vehicles for tracking a benchmark, their sponsors are
under no affirmative duty to boost returns with the proceeds of these stock
lending plans. Competitive market forces may encourage ETF sponsors to
use the proceeds to increase fund returns, but the mutual fund precedent
demonstrates that market forces may not succeed in disciplining investment
advisers who choose to direct such proceeds directly into their own pockets.
Another possible pitfall for ETFs may be the dystopia predicted by
Bogle.192 If, as he fears, investors saving for retirement do in fact manage
to hurt themselves and their savings by aggressively trading their accounts
in and out of ETFs, the ETF may be discredited as a savings vehicle.
VII. CONCLUSION
The ETF industry presents a fascinating opportunity to study the
growth and development of a promising young specimen of financial
innovation. When the mutual fund stumbled, prompting litigators and
regulators to begin drafting complaints and regulations, many investors
found a solution to the troubles in ETFs. With ETFs now headed quickly
towards a potentially awkward adolescence in which they will be forced to
take on important new responsibilities—particularly as the SEC is
beginning to approve actively managed ETFs—the pressure of these novel
and significant developments may expose weaknesses in their design and
execution with profound financial consequences. By beginning with a
thorough understanding of their structure, benefits, and shortcomings,
scholars can expand upon this theoretical examination of ETFs to ascertain
the strengths and weaknesses of ETF's architecture before these funds are
asked to take the strain of huge new infusions of investment.
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